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At Play in the Field of Law: Symbolic Capital
and Foreign Attorneys in LL.M. Programs
JAN HOFFMAN FRENCH*
The article under consideration in this symposium issue, “Foreign
Attorneys in U.S. LL.M. Programs: Who’s In, Who’s Out, and Who They
Are,” by Mindie Lazarus-Black and Julie Globokar, comes at a critical
moment for law schools, especially those below the top tier. Many
schools are reducing class size, offering unprecedented financial aid and
scholarship packages, and entering a general retrenchment mode. This
most recent crisis in law school applications and enrollment
(applications are down at some schools by over 30 percent)1 has led to an
increase in the popularity of Master of Laws (LL.M.) programs for
foreign attorneys. The steep rise in the number and variety of law
schools with LL.M. programs2 may be seen, at least in part, as a
reaction to the power of the law school ranking system adopted in 1990
by U.S. News and World Report (USN). Even before this crisis, law
schools were under pressure to “optimize their ranking by, for example,
basing admissions decisions on LSAT scores” and by “spending more
money on merit-based scholarships in order to ‘buy’ students whose
LSAT scores [would] raise the school’s median.”3 Crucial to
* Jan Hoffman French is Associate Professor of Anthropology at the University of
Richmond (PhD Anthropology Duke University, Durham, N.C.) and was a practicing
attorney for fifteen years (JD University of Connecticut School of Law, Hartford, Conn.).
1. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Potential Sale of Law School Raises Debate Over Who
Should Profit, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2014, at B7 (reporting that total applications at law
schools have declined 40 percent over the last few years).
2. As reported by Carole Silver, between 1998 and 2003, “graduate programs
available to foreign law graduates increased more than fifty percent” with an increasingly
diverse group of schools adding such programs to their offerings. Carole Silver,
Internalizing U.S. Legal Education: A Report on the Education of Transnational Lawyers,
14 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 146 at 147 (2006).
3. Michael Sauder & Ryon Lancaster, Do Rankings Matter? The Effects of U.S. News
& World Report Rankings on the Admissions Process of Law Schools, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV.
105, 115 (2006); see also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 78, 97–98 (2012)
(showing the rise in merit-based aid and the concomitant fall in need-based aid since
1994-95); Bryant G. Garth, Crises, Crisis Rhetoric, and Competition in Legal Education: A
Sociological Perspective on the (Latest) Crisis of the Legal Profession and Legal Education,
24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 503, 523 (2013).
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understanding the recent rise in LL.M. programs is the exclusion of
LL.M. programs from the USN ranking process. In other words, one way
to bolster necessary finances and keep a law school’s USN rank as high
as possible is to establish or expand an LL.M. program that attracts
lawyers from around the world who have the capacity to pay.
Since the very top-ranked law schools remain able to place their
students in high-paying jobs,4 it is particularly important to consider, as
Lazarus-Black and Globokar do, the effects of the LL.M. expansion
trend on second-tier (and below) national and regional law schools. For
those schools, the USN ranking loophole provides a welcome
opportunity for raising funds that, it is hoped, will keep those law
schools from falling even lower in the rankings. A fall in rank augurs a
downward spiral in “quality” (as defined by ranking factors)5 and
attractiveness to potential students and faculty, as well as a
concomitant fall in applications, admissions, and income. Lazarus-Black
and Globokar are interested in showing, through their research at two
non-elite (most likely second-tier) law schools,6 that the LL.M.
expansion trend is not solely the result of a financial strategy. The
authors explain that the increase in foreign-lawyer students in LL.M.
programs should also be understood as a positive development—one
that adds important elements to law school life and practice.7
In this Comment, I would like to pick up a thread of the authors’
analysis and, in so doing, shift the emphasis a bit. That thread relates
to their use of Pierre Bourdieu’s theoretical conceptualizations of “field”
and “forms of capital.” In their analysis of admissions essays submitted
by foreign-lawyer applicants, Lazarus-Black and Globokar consider how
4. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 112 (2012).
5. USN uses the following factors in determining law school rankings: subjective
judgment by reputation (40%); LSAT scores and GPAs (25%); placement success (20%);
and faculty resources (including library) (15%). Sam Flanigan & Robert Morse,
Methodology: 2015 Best Law Schools Rankings, US NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Mar. 10,
2014),
http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-lawschools/articles/
2014/03/10/methodology-2015-best-law-schools-rankings.
6. See Mindie Lazarus-Black & Julie Globokar, Foreign Attorneys in U.S. LL.M.
Programs: Who’s In, Who’s Out, and Who They Are, 22 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 3
(2015). The authors point out that the two schools where they conducted their research
are considered “regular” and are ranked in the top seventy-five by U.S. News and World
Report. Id. at 11-12. The top tier is commonly considered to be the schools numbered in
the top fifty, with the next fifty schools considered second-tier. In some cases, where two
or more schools are ranked at the same number (e.g., there are three numbered twenty),
the following number(s) are empty (in the 2015 rankings, there are three schools
numbered twenty, but no schools numbered twenty-one or twenty-two). This means there
are always approximately fifty schools in the top tier. See generally TOP-LAWSCHOOLS.COM, http://www.top-law-schools.com/rankings.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2014).
7. See Lazarus-Black & Globokar, supra note 6, at 15–16.
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the discursive genre of the admissions essay orients itself to the powerladen structures that constitute the particular field within which the
essay is playing, or to which it is addressed.8 They also use the
Bourdieusian concepts of “cultural and linguistic capital” in relation to
global citizenship and English language acquisition.9 The variety of
tactics that applicants pursue in their essays as they navigate the
contradictory goals required by the admissions process is fascinating to
watch. The authors’ focus is on the nature of the cultural and linguistic
capital that foreign-lawyer applicants perceive they must demonstrate
to gain admission to each of the LL.M. programs under consideration.
At the same time, the authors are interested in what the essays might
reveal about the statuses, life histories, and aspirations of foreign
applicants.
I would like to pull the focus out a notch to place the matter at hand
within a slightly expanded Bourdieusian theoretical framework. To that
end, I will focus on Bourdieu’s treatment of the legal field, primarily in
his 1987 law journal article, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the
Juridical Field.10 As Bourdieu theorizes in relation to any semiautonomous field within society (where a structured, socially patterned,
practice takes place), there is a division of labor.11 In the case of the
legal field, that division of labor includes judges and courtrooms,
lawyers, law firms, government legal practice, and law schools. Legal
education has equal standing with the other subfields, because law
school is where future legal actors (lawyers, judges, legislators, and
legal scholars) develop the capacity and authority to interpret the texts
that determine the law.12 The stability of each field and subfield within
the field (according to the division of labor) is operationalized and
defined by its habitus, which involves deep structures of behavior and

8. Id. at 31–32 (citing PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 21–22
(Richard Nice trans., Cambridge University Press 1977); WILLIAM F. HANKS, LANGUAGE
AND COMMUNICATIVE PRACTICE (1996)).
9. Id. at 34.
10. Pierre Bourdieu & Richard Terdiman, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the
Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805–53 (1987). In that article, Bourdieu uses concepts
developed earlier that continue to have analytical purchase. For a selection of his work
that predated The Force of Law see, for example, BOURDIEU, supra note 8; PIERRE
BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE (Richard Nice
trans., Harvard University Press 1984); Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in
HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 241–58 (John
G. Richardson ed., 1986); PIERRE BOURDIEU, IN OTHER WORDS: ESSAYS TOWARDS A
REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY (Matthew Adamson trans., Stanford University Press 1990).
11. Bourdieu & Terdiman, supra note 10, at 817.
12. PIERRE BOURDIEU, IN OTHER WORDS: ESSAYS TOWARDS A REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY
817 (Matthew Adamson trans., Stanford University Press 1990).

98

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 22:1

practice.13 Habitus incorporates the doxa (matters that are taken for
granted) and governs the manner of interactions within the field,
including the ways that players in the field differentiate between
insiders and outsiders or elites and masses (as the USN rankings
differentiate top-tier schools from the others).14 Society’s rewards are
distributed according to the operation of the field, which is governed by
the accumulation, reproduction, and distribution of “symbolic capital.”
Symbolic capital includes “authority, knowledge, prestige, reputation,
academic degrees,” and is ultimately “convertible into the more
traditional form of economic capital.”15
The stakes are high because legal education is not just a vocational
training program. The skills acquired in law school, when put into
practice, reinforce the symbolic effectiveness of the law—law that
determines practical effects while always appearing to be above the
fray.16 This claim to universality and the practice that “proves it” are
crucial to the entire project. Law school is where the habitus of legal
practice is first encountered and inculcated. It is also where symbolic
capital is accumulated and distributed in the first instance. In law
school, future legal actors learn how to operate in the legal field. It is a
“social space organized around the conversion of direct conflict between
directly concerned parties into juridically-regulated debate between
professionals acting by proxy.”17 Law students learn to compete in the
legal field while also learning to successfully promote the aura of being
objective and ethical. They learn how to exercise the power that
constitutes and perpetuates the field of legal specialists with their
specialized language.18 Therefore, that there have always been struggles
over who gets to walk through the law school’s doors—the gateway to
the powerful legal field—is not surprising.
With this framework in mind, it is instructive to consider how the
growing importance of USN rankings in light of increased competition
for the reduced number of Juris Doctor (JD) applicants has affected the
accumulation and circulation of symbolic capital in the legal education
field. What happens when the habitus of a field is disrupted, whether by
a powerful USN ranking system, by a “crisis” of the legal profession and

13. Bourdieu & Terdiman, supra note 10, at 807, 811.
14. Id. at 810.
15. Richard Terdiman, Translator’s Introduction to Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law:
Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 812 (1987).
16. BOURDIEU, supra note 12, at 830.
17. Id. at 831.
18. Id. at 829.
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hence of legal education,19 or by a rapid increase of LL.M. programs and
the concomitant influx of foreign-lawyer students? In my view, those
disruptions, rather than shaking up the lines of division, perpetuate
them and perhaps entrench them even further.
The drive to quantify, and the public’s perceived need for an easy
way to choose and boast, feeds the hegemonic status of USN law school
rankings. Just a few minutes on Facebook or BuzzFeed will confirm the
enchantment and irresistibility of numbered lists.20 Even the notion of
“trending” reinforces the desire to read or follow the top-numbered
events (or celebrities) of the moment. While not the cause of competition
among law schools, USN ranking is certainly instrumental in shaping
the competition for applicants.21 USN’s law school ranking has
reinforced the operation of distinction by indicating which law schools
are playing in “the big league” (i.e., the top fifty), and which are
relegated to the second, third, and fourth tiers. All of this is based on a
definition of quality whose effect has been to reinforce assumptions
about what is needed to make “good” (meaning successful) lawyers in
the U.S.—success most often considered a high-paying big law firm job
in a major metropolis.22 The USN ranking system, introduced in 1990
and tweaked over the last decade (in 2004 and again in 2010 when it
expanded its numbered ranking to include newly ABA-accredited law
schools23), is a quintessential example of what Bourdieu calls
“misrecognition.”24 Misrecognition is “induced misunderstanding” or the
“process by which power relations come to be perceived . . . in a form
which renders them legitimate,” and it reinforces the hierarchy of law
19. See Garth, supra note 3, for a critique of scholarship on the current “crisis” and a
trenchant analysis of its similarity to the crisis of legal education and the legal profession
of the 1930s.
20. See Paul L. Caron & Rafael Gely, What Law Schools Can Learn from Billy Beane
and the Oakland Athletics, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1483, 1553 (2004) (reviewing MICHAEL LEWIS,
MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2003)).
21. Garth, supra note 3, at 526.
22. TAMANAHA, supra note 4, at 112.
23. MICHAEL SAUDER & WENDY ESPELAND, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL GRANTS
REPORT 07-02, FEAR OF FALLING: THE EFFECTS OF U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT RANKINGS
ON U.S. LAW SCHOOLS 2 (2007).
24. Law school deans and the Law School Admission Council (LSAC), which
administers the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) have consistently objected to the
ranking system. Law Schools and Reputation, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL,
http://www.lsac.org/jd/choosing-a-law-school/ls-reputation (last visited Oct. 7, 2014). A
letter signed by almost all the deans of ABA-accredited law schools objecting to the
method of ranking and the failure “to measure many factors that students claim are most
important” was sent each year to all students who registered to take the LSAT. Sauder &
Lancaster, supra note 3, at 111. The deans are concerned with factors that remain
unmeasured, including “racial and gender diversity within the faculty and student body.”
Id.
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schools by structural means.25 Regardless of which factors are
emphasized to delineate “quality,” competition is defined by the field in
which it plays. In this case, the legal education field and all who play in
it understand the terms of the competition and the most highly valued
factors. Like the law itself, USN ranking carries the power of naming,
and, by publicizing the ranking, it distributes differing amounts of
symbolic capital to the players.26
Because of the differential symbolic capital that comes from USN
rankings, law schools redistribute resources and step up gaming
strategies to ensure the highest possible ranking. A crucial gaming
strategy, mentioned at the opening of this Comment, is to increase
expenditures on merit scholarships with an eye toward encouraging
students with higher LSAT scores to attend, what was earlier termed as
“buying” higher LSAT scores.27 As Sauder and Espeland (2007) report,
“many admissions administrators explained that [the] increase in
money spent on merit scholarships has corresponded to a sharp
decrease in need-based scholarships.”28 This gaming strategy has led to
serious concerns about its impact on student diversity, particularly
since the USN factors do not include a diversity component.29 Here is
where the rise in LL.M. programs for foreign lawyers fits into the
picture—since LL.M. programs are neither separately ranked nor
included in the general law school rankings, tuition income from
foreign-lawyer students can be used to increase merit scholarship offers.
Returning to the article under consideration, this well-known
ranking gaming strategy is reflected in comments from law faculty that
Lazarus-Black and Globokar heard at conferences where they presented
earlier versions of their article.30 Law professors in the audience would
insist that LL.M. programs for foreign lawyers are nothing more than
“cash cows.”31 The authors take exception to this characterization, and

25. Bourdieu & Terdiman, supra note 10, at 813.
26. BOURDIEU, supra note 12, at 838.
27. SAUDER & ESPELAND, supra note 23, at 10.
28. Id. at 11.
29. Id. at 12.
30. Lazarus-Black & Globokar, supra note 6, at 26 n.67.
31. Id. Although faculty voices themselves are not heard very much in the article,
presumably due to the decision to focus on administrators and foreign LL.M. students, we
do catch a glimpse of some classroom issues through administrators who report feeling
pressured by faculty to limit numbers of foreign students to avoid slowing down classes
and requiring longer office hours. Later in the article, gleaning information from the
administrator interviewees, the authors mention faculty interest in comparative and
international law, as well as networking and teaching abroad opportunities that might be
created through their LL.M. students. Id. at 26. The authors might bolster their argument
that foreign students do more than provide needed income with faculty voices about the
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their research shows there is more to LL.M. programs than financial
gain. Lazarus-Black and Globokar point to a more diverse LL.M.
student body—in nationality, ethnicity, gender, and economic
background—among the second-tier schools they studied than the
public is led to expect.32 They are not simply members of elite families
who come for credentials that will add to their chances of election and
appointment to government leadership positions. The foreign-lawyer
LL.M. students whom the authors interviewed (and whose admissions
essays they analyzed) include, for example, middle class women who
plan to use the degree and the English proficiency that comes with it to
advance in their professional lives.33 Also, through their research, the
authors “are able to debunk some of the stereotypes that ‘all’ foreign law
students hail from the highest economic echelons of their countries of
origin and that they are ‘only’ interested in business and making
money.”34 In fact, the authors’ themes of “upward mobility” and trying
to “surmount gender [and] class barriers”35 are critical to understanding
what these “regular” schools offer foreign lawyers who, although they
cannot attend the top schools, are willing to do what it takes to get an
LL.M. degree.
This brings us back to Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic capital. As the
authors’ research reveals, the growth and expansion of LL.M. programs
into law schools below the top tier provide opportunities for a variety of
foreign lawyers who gain symbolic capital that can be accumulated and
then deployed at home.36 However, does symbolic capital also flow in the
other direction? Do law schools accumulate symbolic capital through
expansion of these LL.M. programs?37 The authors identify a certain
degree of additional diversity that foreign lawyers add to the mix of the
law student body that may or may not increase the school’s symbolic
capital.38 The authors also cite research by Carole Silver to the effect
that such a program might enable a law school to boast about its
international and global character or claim to contribute to the

relationship among their scholarly interests, teaching comparative and international law
to U.S. law students, and the participation of foreign lawyers in their classes.
32. Lazarus-Black & Globokar, supra note 6, at 11.
33. Id. at 47–49.
34. Id. at 31.
35. Id. at 17, 63.
36. Id. at 45–46.
37. For the few schools that are sitting on the cusp of the top tier, a single place
upward can mean an increase by as many as 180 JD applications per year. See SAUDER &
ESPELAND, supra note 23, at 30.
38. Lazarus-Black & Globokar, supra note 6, at 56.
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“alleviation of underdevelopment.”39 Given these relatively minor
potential benefits to a law school’s reputation, the authors’ primary
interest is in negating, or at least softening, Brian Tamanaha’s recent
characterization of today’s law schools as more homogeneous, both
economically and racially, than in the past.40 Lazarus-Black and
Globokar’s study “revealed a [LL.M.] student body that was neither
predominantly white nor male nor uniformly privileged.”41 If their
research holds, classroom seats that used to be filled by non-white or
lower and middle class JD students will increasingly be filled by a
diverse group of LL.M. lawyer-students. As the authors admit, the
addition of a diverse group of LL.M. lawyer-students does not reveal the
entire story. They step back from too celebratory a stance to explain
that LL.M.-created diversity may not solve the problem identified by
Tamanaha of decreasing diversity and increasing elitism of law schools
in general.42
Here is where another strategy being used to game the USN
ranking system comes into play and reveals just how insidious the
pursuit of the symbolic capital of ranking can be in legal education.
Some law schools are reclassifying as “probationary” or “part-time” some
first year students with lower LSAT scores, particularly if they are not
white or are from poor backgrounds.43 This reclassification keeps the
lower LSAT scores out of the pool reported to USN, and thus prevents
the school’s ranking from suffering. Before the current crisis began
playing out fully, the total number of law schools was growing
substantially, thus providing avenues to upward mobility for U.S.
college students from a broad range of previously excluded backgrounds.
Law schools became more inclusive, and even if many of those students
were attending schools below the top tier, those students benefitted
from the symbolic capital that the law degree conferred.44 Assuming
that inclusiveness is an important value, as evidenced by law school
deans’ objections to USN’s failure to include diversity in its “factors of
excellence,”45 law school should be accessible and its access should be as
equitable as possible. Otherwise, given the “powerful position of law in
the governance of the state and the economy” and the “greater role for
law in the governance of the global economy,” unequal distribution of

39. Id. at 28 (citing Carole Silver, Internalizing U.S. Legal Education: A Report on the
Education of Transnational Lawyers, 14 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 146, 154 (2006)).
40. TAMANAHA, supra note 4, at 86–87, 130.
41. Lazarus-Black & Globokar, supra note 6, at 57.
42. Id. at 56–57.
43. SAUDER & ESPELAND, supra note 23, at 13.
44. Garth, supra note 3, at 526.
45. For USN’s criteria and methodology, see Flanigan & Morse, supra note 5.
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symbolic and economic capital will be reinforced beginning with the law
school admission process.46
The two gaming strategies discussed above, taken together, reveal a
disturbing picture—the ghettoization of students (U.S. and foreign)
whose presence in law school may be a liability for the school’s ranking.
Ultimately, that ghettoization leads to a developing hierarchy within
law student populations, reinscribing an older version of law school as
an elite enterprise—when those in the golden circle count and those
outside do not. If that hierarchization is one of the necessary costs of
diversifying law student bodies in the United States as schools become
ever more desperate to move up in the rankings, scholars researching
those phenomena must consider how symbolic capital is accumulated,
reproduced, and distributed within the field of legal education. In that
regard, I would like to echo the authors’ call for research that spans a
cross section of law schools.47 Lazarus-Black and Globokar have given
us a taste of how painting all foreign LL.M. programs with the brush of
elitism and assuming they are simply “cash cows” can lead to a
misinterpretation of the possible roles foreign-lawyer students can play
at differently tiered law schools. Understanding how the entrenched
ratings system affects the future of legal education requires careful
consideration of the unintended consequences of gaming that system.

46. Garth, supra note 3, at 519.
47. Lazarus-Black & Globokar, supra note 6, at 63.

